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Abstract
Adversarial training was introduced as a way to im-
prove the robustness of deep learning models to ad-
versarial attacks. This training method improves ro-
bustness against adversarial attacks, but increases the
models vulnerability to privacy attacks. In this work
we demonstrate how model inversion attacks, extract-
ing training data directly from the model, previously
thought to be intractable become feasible when at-
tacking a robustly trained model. The input space for
a traditionally trained model is dominated by adver-
sarial examples - data points that strongly activate a
certain class but lack semantic meaning - this makes
it difficult to successfully conduct model inversion at-
tacks. We demonstrate this effect using the CIFAR-10
dataset under three different model inversion attacks,
a vanilla gradient descent method, gradient based
method at different scales, and a generative adversar-
ial network base attacks.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models have gathered a large
amount of success in recent years, with applications
in several industries. These models are increasingly
being used in safety critical scenarios with data that
is both public or private, such as health data or cus-
tomer photos. As we increasingly rely on machine
learning, it is critical to assess the dangers of the
vulnerabilities in these models.
In a supervised learning environment several com-
ponents make up the learning pipeline of a machine
learning model: collection of training data, definition
of model architecture, model training, and model out-
puts – test and evaluation. This pipeline presents a
broader attack surface, where adversaries can lever-
age system vulnerabilities to compromise data privacy
and/or model performance. There are four main types
of attacks discussed in literature:
• model fooling – small perturbation to the user
input leads to large changes in the model output
[4], [2]
• model extraction – the model is reverse engi-
neered from its outputs [17].
• model poisoning– the training process is altered
to create vulnerabilities at inference [5], [19].
• model inversion– the model is used to re-generate
or gain information on the training data [19], [15]
However these attacks are assumed to be performed
in vacuum, with little discussion on the interplay be-
tween defense strategies for different types of attacks.
In this paper we focus on model fooling and model
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inversion, with emphasis on how mitigating one attack
can increase vulnerabilities in the other.
Figure 1: Model inversion results on ATT data.
Model inversion attacks directly attack the privacy
of the training dataset. There are several scenarios
where the data needs to be kept private either for
financial reasons or because we want to protect the
training members privacy. For example if we train
our model on text data that includes social security
numbers, we do not want anyone to be able to access
such information from the training data if we make
the model public. Previous work on model inversion
has explored small datasets and small models. [3] per-
formed model inversion of facial images on a logisitic
regression model trained with the ATT dataset [1].
Although the methods were successful on the small
dataset (400 gray-scale images) they do not directly
extend to larger datasets as demonstrated by [15].
Even with the small dataset and model, this approach
only works on classes that do not vary in pose or posi-
tion within the dataset, as demonstrated in Figure 1.
Here the top images demonstrate a successful recon-
struction and the bottom images show results, using
the same methodology, on another category that is not
well reconstructed. [15] demonstrated the difficulty of
model inversion by applying the Frederickson attack to
a convolutional neural network trained on the CIFAR-
10 dataset. The reconstructed images demonstrated
no recognizable semantic meaning demonstrating the
ineffectiveness of the attack.
Model fooling attacks have gathered much more
attention and success. With several variations of a
gradient based attack, the models output can be dras-
tically changed with a small change in the input to the
model. Several different defenses have been proposed
to alleviate this problem, including model distillation,
image blurring and denoising [13], [8], [2]. Recently,
a promising defense has been obtained with the idea
of adversarially trained models (ATM) [9], [18]. This
involves formulating the traditional training process
as a min-max problem. First an adversarial example
is maximized to fool the model, while staying within a
L2 distance from the training image. Then the model
is trained to minimize the loss to these adversarial
examples. [9] demonstrated that adversarial train-
ing also comes with other consequences, namely a
trade-off with accuracy as well as better alignment of
semantic representation between a model and human
perception.
In this paper we explore how this improved se-
mantic representation of ATM affects the privacy of
training data specific to model inversion attacks. We
demonstrate that by improving the semantic repre-
sentation that models have, we are able to generate
better model inversion reconstructions.
2 Approach
This work focuses on three image classification models,
referred here as the target models. The target models
are trained to classify images of the CIFAR-10 dataset
[6], [7]. One model is robustly trained and the other
two models are trained in a traditional manner. The
target models are then attacked with three different
model inversion attacks. In this scenario the goal of
the model inversion attack is to reconstruct an image
from the training dataset.
2.1 Target Models
The first model that we test is a traditionally trained
model(TTM) using the VGG16 architecture (TTM-
VGG16) changing the fully connected layers to handle
the CIFAR image size [16]. The model was trained for
2
100 epochs with a batch size of 128, using an Adam
optimizer with a learning rate of 0.001. This resulted
in a model with 82.2% validation accuracy and 99.2%
training accuracy.
The second model that was used is based on the w28-
10 wide-resnet architecture and again was traditionally
trained (TTM-Res) [20]. The model optimizer was
stochastic gradient descent with momentum of 0.9
and weight decay of 0.0002. The learning rate was
0.01 for 100 epochs. The final accuracies were 84.9%
and 95.7% for the validation and training respectively.
The final model, an adversarially trained model
(ATM), is based on the w28-10 wide-resnet architec-
ture (ATM-Res) following the work of [9]. This model
was trained with adversarial examples generated with
the Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [4]. The attack
was allowed to perturb the image up to 10 pixel counts
with the image range being from 0-255. The step size
of the attack was 2 and the attack had 10 iterations
to find an adversarial example. The model optimizer
was stochastic gradient descent with momentum of
0.9 and weight decay of 0.0002. The learning rate
was 0.1 for the first 100 epochs and 0.01 for the next
50 and 0.001 for the following 50 epochs, for a total
of 200 epochs. The final accuracies were 78.5% and
99.7% for the validation and training respectively.
2.2 Model Inversion Attacks
The first attack that we explore is a basic gradient
based attack. Here we start by inputting a blank gray
image (128 for 0-255 range) and backpropagate to op-
timize the image such that it maximizes a particular
output category that we are interested in extracting.
We start with a blank image instead of random in-
puts as the optimization does not remove all of the
randomness that it is initialized with and a crisper
reconstruction is generated with a homogenous image
input. The image does not necessarily have to start
as gray and other homogeneous initialization could be
used but gray gives best results for the most classes.
Instead of changing the weights of our model, as in
regular training, we change the input pixels of the
image to maximize a category that we want to extract.
This method is very similar to the projected gradient
descent (PGD) that is used for model fooling, mainly
changing the input from a natural image to a blank
input. The gradient step is calculated as follows,
Xt+1 = clip(Xt + lr ∗G) (1)
with Xt being the image at iteration t, clipping is
applied to keep the image within the 0-255 range. G
is the loss gradient with respect to the image, where
the loss is the output of the model for a particular
class before softmax.
The next model inversion attack is based on the
principle of Googles DeepDream method of optimizing
at different image resolution scales [11]. The way the
original DeepDream algorithm works is by taking
a natural image as an input and scaling it down a
preset number of octaves with each octave scaling
down the image by a preset octave scale. This scaled
down image is then scaled back up to the original
image dimensions effectively blurring the image and
focusing on low frequency features. Once this low
resolution image has been optimized it is upscaled and
reoptimized at a higher resolution until all octaves are
optimized. We use this technique for model inversion
by inputting a blank image and running through the
entire DeepDream method for 5 iterations. We use
a downsampling octave scale of 2 and run a total
of 4 octaves for each downsampled image we run 10
iterations of gradient descent optimization. We also
added normalization loss as in [10]. The gradient step
is modified from the PGD attack as,
Xt+1 = clip
(
Xt + lr ∗ G|G|mean
)
(2)
where G|G|mean is the average of the absolute value of
the gradients at that iteration step.
Figure 2 illustrates the architecture of the gener-
ative adversarial network (GAN) used for model in-
version. The main goal of using a GAN for model
inversion is to better constrain reconstructed images
to be realistic images. We followed the auxiliary clas-
sifier (AC) GAN method, modifying it to use the
classification loss from the target model [12]. The
method starts by inputting a vector of one-hot class
labels followed by random numbers. This input vec-
tor is fed into the generator, which is composed of
7 transpose convolutions each followed by a ReLU.
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Figure 2: Diagram of the generative adversarial net-
work used for model inversion. a vector of one-hot
class labels and random normal numbers is input
to the generator. The generator creates an image I’
which is then fed to the discriminator with real images.
The discriminator is trained to classify real images
and to discriminate real images from generated im-
ages. The generated images are also fed to the target
model and the generator is trained to generate real
images and fool the target model.
The generator outputs an image that is fed to the dis-
criminator. The discriminator is made of 7 blocks of
convolutional, batchnorm, leaky ReLUs, and dropout
layers. The convolutional layers are 5 by 5 filters,
the leaky ReLU has a negative slope of 0.2, and the
dropout rate was 0.5. The discriminator is trained on
a real-fake loss and a class loss, the class loss is only
calculated for real images since the target model will
classify the generated images. The real images that
are used to train the discriminator are the validation
images for the CIFAR-10 dataset representing what
could be used in a real world attack to constrain the
generated images to realistic images, this out of set
images for model inversion is called shadow data in
literature [14]. The generated images are also fed into
the target model to calculate the class loss for the
generator. The generator is trained on the discrimi-
nators real-fake loss as well as the target models class
loss. The optimizer for both the discriminator and
generator are Adam optimizers with a learning rate
of 0.0002 and betas of 0.5 and 0.999.
3 Results
In this section we demonstrate the differences between
attacking a TTM and an ATM. The main goal of this
comparison is to understand how adversarial attacks
and privacy attacks are related. We focus on answer-
ing three fundamental questions:
1. Is there a difference in the vulnerability to privacy
attacks by defending against adversarial attacks?
2. What fundamentally is causing this relationship?
3. Are privacy concerns enough to keep models from
being robustly trained?
3.1 PGD model inversion
Just like[15] we observe that PGD attacks for model
inversion do not reconstruct semantically meaningful
images for TTM. At best the images generated can
aide in identifying the label of a particular class, but
does not provide any information on a particular data
point. Images generated from TTM-VGG have very
sharp edges and lines throughout with some slight
semantic meaning. TTM-Res has slightly more seman-
tic meaning but is plagued by fractal patterns of the
category being generated (This is highlighted in 3.1).
These images also have extensive checker patterns
throughout the images. As shown in Figure 3, once
a model is adversarially trained, the reconstructions
become more semantically meaningful. The images
are clearer and focused on individual samples of the
category.
The optimization process of the reconstructions also
significantly changes. As seen in Figure 4 the TTM-
Res quickly optimizes the image, creating an image
that is classified as a bird within 3 iterations, while
the ATM-Res takes 1136 iterations to be classified
as the target class of bird. This highlights the preva-
lence of adversarial examples in the input space of
the TTM. Even if we randomly initialize the images
with different inputs, the TTM takes two orders of
magnitude fewer iterations to generate an image that
is classified as the class that we are targeting. Because
the model embedding of the TTM does not have a
4
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Figure 3: Reconstructed images of the 10 CIFAR-10 classes generated from gradient ascent model inversion
attack. Top middle and bottom row are attacking the TTM-VGG, TTM-Res and ATM-Res respectively.
strong semantic representation, a wide range of adver-
sarial examples satisfy the target category boundary
conditions– for almost any image initialization there
is an adversarial example that is near that input.
The activation values of TTM-Res, and ATM-Res
differ by almost an order of magnitude, with the bird
activations being 150 and 44 for the TTM-Res and
ATM-Res respectively. The average activation value
on the training data is 11 and 7 for the tradition-
ally trained model and adversarially trained model
respectively. When we input the reconstructed image
from the ATM-Res into the TTM-Res we get a bird
activation value of 21 still significantly smaller than
150, but much higher than the average training im-
age. This demonstrates that all of the reconstructions
have higher activations than naturally occurring im-
ages. The adversarially trained reconstruction is not
a minimum in the TTM-Res because of the nearby
adversarial examples and once those examples are
removed it becomes a minimum.
Inputting a real training image into the model inver-
sion we can further distinguish the characteristics of
the two models. In Figure 5 we can see that inputting
a cat image from the training data to TTM-Res, the
model inversion attack begins to generate multiple ex-
tra cats and drastically changes the image. The overall
image information is lost and none of the shapes are
preserved. While for ATM-Res, the reconstructed im-
age focuses more on emphasizing traits that defined
a cat in the entire dataset and focuses on contrasting
the cat from the background. The robustly trained
model reconstruction also begins to remove informa-
tion about the background, for example blurring the
foot and pants.
3.2 DeepDream model inversion
DeepDream model inversion is able to push the im-
age reconstruction away from adversarial examples
through its use of multiple scales. This acts as a filter
focusing the reconstruction first on low frequency fea-
tures and then adding higher frequency characteristics
as the reconstruction is scaled up. This greatly im-
proves the reconstruction in TTM as demonstrated in
Figure 6. But since ATM have a decreased prevalence
of adversarial examples this method does not improve
the model inversion on these models. This method
is more successful with TTM-VGG than TTM-Res.
TTM-Res tend to generate reconstructions that at-
tempt to have multiples of the class in question. As
seen Figure 6 the TTM-Res generated images have
several wheels, antlers, cats, dogs, for the classes of
trucks, deer, cats and dogs respectively. This is one of
the defining traits in the DeepDream method, but is
not observed in the TTM-VGG, suggesting that the
skip connections in the resnet architecture allow the
model to consider more examples of a class as more
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Figure 4: The activation loss during the gradient
descent process for 10000 iterations for generating
a bird. The dashed and solid line represent the ad-
versarially trained and traditionally trained model
respectively. The y-axis on the left is for the nor-
mally trained model while the y-axis on the right is
for the adversarially trained model. Note the order of
magnitude difference in the two axis.
likely being that class. This characteristic make model
inversion more difficult as small scale features can be
extracted but larger scale features are more difficult
to obtain. By adversarially training the resnet model,
this characteristic of having multiple examples of the
class in one image is also removed. The ATM-Res
extracted images are highly focused on one single, spe-
cific, individual and create distinct contrast between
the main subject/category and the image background.
The background of the extracted images highlights
what remains private in the model, with backgrounds
of dogs mainly being contrasting colors, while the
background for planes, deer, horses, boats, trucks
have blue skies, grass, open field, water, and roads
reflecting backgrounds consistent within all of these
classes while dogs have more varied backgrounds in
the dataset.
Adversarial
training
Traditional
training
Real image
input
Figure 5: Reconstructed images from the input cat
for traditionally and adversarially trained models.
3.3 GAN model inversion
By using a GAN we are further constraining the im-
age generation process to generate real images. The
goal is to push the generated images away from adver-
sarial images or non-semantically meaningful images,
toward realistic looking images. For the TTM the
training process quickly finds a way to fool the target
network, in essence adding a small amount of noise
and focusing on fooling the discriminator. This lim-
its the ability to extract information from the target
model as the generated images are more representative
of the shadow dataset than the target dataset.
4 Discussion
4.1 Generating different samples
Although the number of training images that are vul-
nerable to model inversion are limited, it is possible to
obtain different reconstructions using different inputs.
For PGD model inversion, we can input homogeneous
images but that limits our reconstruction to a handful
of images. We can also input random values but this
hurts the overall structure of the image. As seen in
Figure 8 the reconstructions do generate various birds
but start loosing the detailed information. Further-
more to create more varied birds one would require
larger variance in the noise, which further amplifies
the loss in semantic representation of the images. Blur-
ring and incorporating an L2 loss to the optimization
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Figure 6: Reconstructed images of the 10 CIFAR-10 classes generated from deep dream model inversion
attack. Top middle and bottom row are attacking the TTM-VGG, TTM-Res and ATM-Res respectively.
Figure 7: Reconstructed images of the 10 CIFAR-10 classes generated from a GAN model inversion attack
with different weights on the target class.
can aid with these problems but does not improve
significantly.
Figure 9 illustrates nine different birds obtained
from the DeepDream model inversion. The Deep-
Dream model inversion is more suitable for inputting
different random inputs as it naturally blurs and
smooths out the random input into the reconstructed
image. In Figure 9 we can see that the color of the
birds changes but also some of the shapes, namely an
apparent ostrich and hummingbird in the middle and
bottom left image respectively.
4.2 Model inversion metrics
The success of the model inversion attack is one of
the main challenges when developing different attack
methods. When evaluating the attack there are two
main challenges, finding the nearest image in the
dataset and quantifying the similarity between the
reconstructed image and the image in the dataset.
For this reason previous model inversion attacks were
analyzed qualitatively.
We take a two prong approach to provide a quanti-
tative metric to judge model inversion attack efficacy–
identifying the nearest data point to the reconstructed
image and quantifying the similarity separately. First
7
Figure 8: Nine different example birds reconstructed
with PGD model inversion using random inputs.
we identify the most similar data point by inputting
the images into the target model, and extract a feature
vector from the final convolutional layer. This feature
vector is then used to find the cosine similarity of the
nearest image to our reconstructed image. Figure 10
shows training images that were found to be the clos-
est to our model inversion attack reconstruction (here
for bird category). Note training images closest to
our TTM model reconstructions have large variability
in pose, type of bird, and background, whereas those
found for the ATM reconstruction pertain to the same
type of bird. Here we can see the blue neck and black
body of the birds similar to our reconstruction. To
show this is not category dependent, we also show
results for horse for the ATM.
ATM-Res and TTM-Res have an average maximum
similarity score of 0.85 and 0.78 respectively while
TTM-VGG has an average similarity score of 0.99.
This suggest that TTM-VGG cannot differentiate
intra-class variability. Once we obtain the image that
the model believes is most similar we can then calcu-
Figure 9: Nine different example birds reconstructed
with DeepDream model inversion using random in-
puts.
late the L2 image distance to quantify the similarity
of our reconstructed image to the nearest training im-
age. The average L2 is 82.4, 132.5, 97.1 for ATM-Res,
TTM-VGG, and TTM-Res respectively. Figure 11
demonstrates the trade-off between the privacy loss
we describe and an adversarial radius. The adversarial
radius is calculated by applying the PGD adversar-
ial attack until the image is misclassified. The four
points on Figure 11 are from the TTM-VGG, TTM-
Res, ATM-Res10, ATM-Res, where ATM-Res10 is
ATM-Res after 10 epochs. Here we can see how the
increase in adversarial radius by making the model
more robust decreases the privacy loss.
4.3 Background privacy
The difference between TTM and ATM is drastic when
it comes to privacy vulnerabilities. Image data can
hide within the adversarial examples but are easier
to obtain in ATM. Even with ATM features that are
not necessary to identify a particular class remain oc-
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Figure 10: Nearest cosine similar training images to model inversion image on the left. First row is for
TTM-VGG bird, second row is TTM-Res bird, third row is ATM-Res bird and fourth row is ATM-Res horse.
cluded. Advertisement on trucks and logos on planes
can be seen but the specifics cannot be identified
and are only seen as blured lines in the reconstructed
images.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented the trade-offs between
defending against an adversarial attack and a privacy
attack by applying three model inversion attacks to
three different models. We demonstrated that training
a model adversarially (a common adversarial defense)
leaves it vulnerable to privacy attacks, namely model
inversion attacks that can reconstruct training images
directly from the target model. Throughout our three
different model inversion attacks, we found it difficult
to attack the privacy of TTM while they were trivial
to attack adversarially. On the other hand, we were
able to better attack ATM but required a greater L2
distance to attack adversarially.
By looking at the activations of the two models we
observed that TTM have adversarial examples with
the highest activations of any of the models. The
reconstructed images from ATM were found to have
a high value in both the TTM and ATM activations.
This suggest that these images are minimums for both
models if not for the adversarial examples. When
these semantically meaningless adversarial examples
are removed, as done in the case of an ATM, the high-
est activations decrease and are left with semantically
meaningful minimums. We further analyze this by
looking at how these attacks work when seeded with
a training image. An ideal model inversion attack
would output the same input training image without
modification. We observe that the TTM changes the
image into an adversarial example while the ATM
highlights the key features of the class while blurring
out non-key features.
We also observed that when features are not consis-
tent throughout a class’ data samples the information
is maintained private in the model, such as back-
grounds of some classes, but when they are important
such as a boat being in the ocean or cars on the road
this information is maintained. This is the crucial
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Figure 11: Adversarial radius vs privacy loss, for
TTM-VGG, TTM-Res, ATM-Res10, and ATM-Res
from left to right.
step in obtaining privacy defenses for ATM.
The three attacks that we use highlight how tra-
ditional model inversion attacks on TTM can be im-
proved with more sophisticated methods but do not
provide as much information as a gradient attack on
an ATM. The prevalence of adversarial examples in
TTM is such that there is almost always an adversar-
ial minimum near any point making model inversion
difficult. PGD was only successful with ATM and
could only generate a limited amount of images for
ATM. Just like for adversarial cases it works well as
a standard attack for privacy attacks. DeepDream
attacks extend PGD attacks to generate more various
images, while maintaining larger structures. Deep-
Dream model inversion attacks improved the results
on TTM but still are not capable of providing fine
scale reconstructions. When applied on ATM the
reconstructions do not improve significantly but are
stable enough to receive random noise as input allow-
ing for different images to be generated.
We also presented a method for quantifying the
success of the model inversion metric, by using the
output of the last convolutional layers as a feature
vector. We then used this feature vector to find the
nearest cosine similarity between our model inverted
image and the images in the training dataset. The
success of the model inversion attack was then cal-
culated as the L2 between the nearest cosine similar
image and the model inverted image.
With ATM increasing the vulnerabilities of privacy
attacks, model inversion attacks must be reconsidered
when working on private data. Models should at the
very least be qualitatively analyzed for data leaks. For
the most part, backgrounds are kept private but color
and shape of some of the training data is not safe
from privacy attacks. More work needs to be done
to address the quantification of the success of these
privacy attacks, to be able to separate whether an
attack extracts a specific training sample or trends in
the dataset. Additionally, a better evaluation metric
will allow for more advanced attacks and defenses to
be developed.
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